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FOREWORD 
 
  CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 
Howard M. Erichson*
 
 
These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions . . . .  They should be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding. 
- Rule 1, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1
Many of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities are prescribed in the 
Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .  The Rules of Professional Conduct 
are rules of reason.  They should be interpreted with reference to the 
purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. 
 
- Preamble & Scope, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct2
 
 
What’s the difference between a proceduralist and an ethicist?  It may 
sound like a joke in search of a punch line (if you come up with a good one, 
let me know), but here it serves as the set-up for a wide-ranging collection 
of papers on civil procedure and the legal profession. 
Aficionados of civil procedure and legal ethics share much in common.  
Both deal with detailed sets of rules.  Both try to understand these rules in 
light of their purposes, context, and interactions.  Both sets of rules aim to 
regulate the operation of the legal system in the interest of justice.  Both 
sets of rules govern essential aspects of the civil litigation process, while 
both stand apart from the substantive legal norms that govern civil disputes.  
That is, they are process rules; they are less about the what than about the 
how.3
 
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Having taught both civil procedure 
and professional responsibility virtually every year since joining the legal academy over 
fifteen years ago, each subject has infused my thinking about the other and it has become 
second nature for me to think about procedural problems in light of lawyers’ relationships to 
their clients and to the legal system.  I thank Bruce Green and Jessi Tamayo for the 
opportunity to put together this symposium issue on the intersection of the two fields, and I 
thank the authors for a rich and provocative set of papers. 
 
 1. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope ¶¶ 7, 14. 
 3. The term “adjective law,” while not used much these days, captures this aspect of 
commonality between procedural and ethical rules.  Legal ethics can be either “adjective” or 
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Despite these commonalities, procedural and ethical rules differ both in 
their target and in the dominant theories that underlie them.  Rules of civil 
procedure largely concern the doings of the courts whereas rules of 
professional responsibility concern the doings of lawyers.  To the extent 
they embrace philosophical underpinnings, proceduralists tend to look to 
political philosophy4 while ethicists more often look to moral philosophy.5
Procedural regulation of the courts and professional regulation of lawyers 
provide two approaches to problems that arise in civil litigation.  These 
approaches sometimes prove to be complementary, sometimes duplicative, 
and sometimes conflicting.  In the papers in this Symposium issue of the 
Fordham Law Review, we see examples of complementariness, duplication, 
and conflict between the law of civil procedure and the law of professional 
responsibility.  We also see some differences between those who view the 
problems of civil litigation primarily through the lens of procedure and 
those who view these problems primarily through the lens of ethics. 
 
In a paper that patrols the procedure-ethics boundary, Andrew Perlman 
confronts the tension raised by the existence of parallel bodies of law that 
purport to tell lawyers how to conduct themselves in civil litigation.6  
According to Perlman, “the parallel law in the civil litigation context does 
not merely supplement or complement the rules of professional conduct; it 
is increasingly in tension with the ethics rules.”7  He points, for example, to 
provisions for punishing lawyer misconduct in civil litigation, particularly 
Rules 11, 26, and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure8 and Section 
1927 of Title 28.9  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct track the Rule 
11 standard in Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.1;10
 
“substantive” depending on the point of view.  When viewed as a set of regulations 
governing the legal industry, rules of professional conduct may properly be understood as 
substantive to the same extent as rules governing insurance, banking, or any other regulated 
industry.  When viewed as part of the operation of the justice system, however, rules of 
professional conduct are adjectival in the same sense as procedural rules—rather than speak 
to what result ought to be reached, they speak to how we get there. 
 they echo the 
 4. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules:  The Need for Procedure Theory, 
61 OKLA. L. REV. 319 (2008); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 
181 (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); DANIEL 
MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS:  ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 
(2008). 
 6. Andrew Perlman, The Parallel Law of Lawyering in Civil Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1965 (2011). 
 7. Id. 
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (authorizing courts to impose sanctions on lawyers who present 
pleadings or other papers for an improper purpose or that contain legally frivolous positions, 
factually baseless allegations, or factually baseless denials); id. at R. 26(g) (authorizing 
courts to impose sanctions for frivolous discovery requests and responses); id. at R. 37 
(authorizing courts to impose sanctions for discovery misconduct). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (authorizing courts to impose costs and fees on an attorney who 
“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously”). 
 10. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (prohibiting frivolous claims, defenses, 
and contentions).  In this Foreword, I use “Rule” to refer to a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure and “RPC” to refer to a Model Rule of Professional Conduct. 
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discovery obligations of Rules 26 and 37 in RPC 3.4(d);11 and they reflect 
the duty implicit in Section 1927 in RPC 3.2.12  One might assume that 
such redundancy is costless or that these echoes are not really redundant 
because the civil procedure provisions authorize judicial sanctions as part of 
the litigation process whereas the rules of professional conduct authorize 
professional discipline through the lawyer disciplinary process.  Perlman 
argues, however, that not only do these rules of professional conduct serve 
no useful purpose on top of the procedural provisions, they create confusion 
and “undermine the law-like status of the Model Rules.”13  Using similar 
examples concerning conflicts of interest and inadvertent disclosures, 
Perlman shows the dangers of parallel sets of rules governing lawyer 
conduct.  He makes the case that the rules of professional conduct should 
cede responsibility for regulating lawyer conduct in civil litigation where 
those rules “are not enforced as a matter of discipline, are in conflict with 
other sources of law, and are causing confusion about the applicable 
governing standards.”14
Several of the papers in the Symposium focus on particular aspects of 
civil litigation and flesh out the procedural issues in terms of lawyers’ 
duties to their clients and to the legal system.  Michele DeStefano Beardslee 
looks at the work product doctrine as a way to understand the evolving role 
of the corporate attorney.
  A scholar whose work straddles both ethics and 
procedure, Perlman comes down firmly on the side of the rules of civil 
procedure in these areas of overlap, but mostly as a means to safeguard the 
integrity of the rules of professional conduct. 
15  Benjamin Spencer considers the pre-litigation 
duty to preserve evidence and asks what role the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure can play in defining lawyers’ duties to their clients and to the 
legal system in this increasingly contentious area.16  Lynn Baker and 
Charles Silver consider contingent-fee representation of plaintiffs in civil 
litigation in light of lawyers’ fiduciary duties to place their clients’ interests 
ahead of their own.17
Beardslee tackles a procedural question and an ethical one.  The 
procedural question is whether the work product doctrine
  In each paper, procedural issues shed light on the 
duty and role of lawyers, and vice versa. 
18
 
 11. Id. at R. 3.4(d) (prohibiting frivolous discovery requests and failures to comply with 
proper discovery requests). 
 should apply 
differently to “law” work and “business” work.  The ethical question then 
becomes what is the proper role of a corporate lawyer.  According to 
Beardslee, we cannot make sense of the work product doctrine in the 
 12. Id. at R. 3.2 (requiring lawyers to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
consistent with the interests of the client”). 
 13. Perlman, supra note 6, at 1973. 
 14. Id. at 1984. 
 15. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business out of Work Product, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1869 (2011). 
 16. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Preservation Obligation:  Regulating and Sanctioning 
Pre-Litigation Spoliation in Federal Court, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005 (2011). 
 17. Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees:  Preliminary Thoughts, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1833 (2011). 
 18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
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corporate context unless we properly understand the evolving role of the 
attorney in corporate practice.19
Of the participants in the Symposium, Benjamin Spencer is probably the 
one most thoroughly a proceduralist.  Whereas Beardslee takes a procedural 
question and explores it in light of professional duties, Spencer takes a 
question of professional duty and explores it in light of litigation procedure.  
As electronic information storage and discovery have gained in centrality, 
questions about the duty to preserve evidence have become some of the 
hottest questions in civil litigation.  Spencer urges the adoption of a uniform 
federal approach to the pre-litigation duty to preserve and to sanctions for 
spoliation of evidence.
  In a world where corporate clients demand 
holistic and interdisciplinary advice from lawyers, she argues, the 
discoverability of lawyers’ work should not depend upon a distinction 
between “law” and “business” functions that lawyers perform for clients in 
connection with civil litigation.  Beardslee, whose work has largely focused 
on professional responsibility, fruitfully approaches the discoverability 
issue as a question about the corporate lawyer-client relationship. 
20  He proposes amendments to Rules 26 and 37 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to codify and clarify the judicial power 
to impose sanctions for the failure to preserve evidence.21  Interestingly, 
Spencer describes his proposed rule as one that creates an obligation or duty 
to preserve information in anticipation of litigation.22  This description 
needs no further explanation in terms of how litigators experience sanctions 
rules, but in the context of this Symposium, it is worth pausing over the 
question of what sorts of rules create professional duties as opposed to 
establishing powers and processes.  For the most part, rules of procedure 
create lawyer duties implicitly or indirectly whereas rules of professional 
conduct create lawyer duties explicitly and directly.  Returning to an 
example from Perlman’s paper, Rule 11 spells out what an attorney’s 
signature signifies and procedures for sanctioning lawyers when these 
significations prove false,23 in contrast to RPC 3.1’s explicit instruction to 
lawyers that they “shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing 
so that is not frivolous.”24  Perlman makes the point that rules of procedure 
and ethics nonetheless overlap in their goals and instructions, and regulation 
of lawyer conduct in civil litigation may be better handled by rules of 
procedure.25
 
 19. Beardslee, supra note 15. 
  Spencer’s proposed rule may be understood in the same light.  
 20. Spencer, supra note 16. 
 21. See id. at 2021–23. 
 22. Id. at 2022 (“The proposed amendment to Rule 37(e), below, establishes the 
preservation obligation itself by authorizing courts to sanction discovery responses that are 
incomplete due to the failure to preserve information in anticipation of litigation.  It also 
affirms the existence of a duty to preserve once litigation commences . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (requiring signature); id. at R. 11(b) (stating what an attorney 
certifies by presenting a pleading or other paper to the court); id. at R. 11(c) (authorizing 
sanctions and establishing procedures). 
 24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1. 
 25. See Perlman, supra note 6. 
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By authorizing sanctions and spelling out their basis, his rule would 
establish a duty for lawyers and litigants in an area that Perlman’s analysis 
suggests is more effectively governed by rules of procedure than by rules of 
ethics. 
Lynn Baker and Charles Silver, in their paper on fees and fiduciary 
duties, draw a distinction between self-interested conduct by lawyers in 
connection with lawyers’ contractual right to payment and self-interested 
conduct by lawyers in violation of fiduciary duties to clients.26  They apply 
their analysis to several issues concerning steps lawyers take to protect their 
fee interests, such as fighting judicial fee-capping orders.27  On the question 
of whether fees may be addressed as part of a multiparty settlement 
negotiation, they take a strong position that “there is no reason whatsoever 
for issues involving the allocation of the gross settlement process between 
the plaintiffs and their attorneys to be included in the settlement 
negotiations between the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the defendant.”28
The Baker and Silver analysis, while applicable to fee issues in both 
single-client and multi-client situations, focuses significantly on problems 
that arise in mass multi-plaintiff litigation.
 
29  Mass litigation raises special 
problems at the intersection of civil procedure and legal ethics.  In this area, 
procedures such as class actions30 and multidistrict litigation (MDL)31 
permit aggregation that alters the nature of the attorney-client relationship.  
Thus, it makes sense that two of the Symposium papers examine the role of 
lawyers in particular types of mass litigation.  Charles Silver explores the 
role of lawyers appointed to leadership roles in multidistrict litigation,32 and 
Alexandra Lahav offers a new way of thinking about the attorney-client 
relationship in class actions.33
In a piece that builds on the fiduciary duty paper he co-authored with 
Baker, Silver takes up the question of the duties owed by lawyers appointed 
to leadership positions in MDL.
 
34  He shows that although courts regularly 
award significant fees to leadership counsel, courts virtually never squarely 
address the question of lead counsel duties.35
 
 26. Baker & Silver, supra note 17. 
  Treating the question as a 
corollary of procedural due process, he concludes that lead attorneys in 
MDL owe fiduciary duties to all of the litigants whose interests they are 
appointed to serve, and that lead attorneys also owe fiduciary duties to the 
other lawyers.  In other words, “they must use their control of MDLs solely 
to benefit claimants (directly) and disabled lawyers (indirectly) by 
 27. Id. at 1845–50. 
 28. Id. at 1866. 
 29. See id. at 1845–50, 1865. 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
 32. Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multi-District 
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985 (2011). 
 33. Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939 
(2011). 
 34. Silver, supra note 32. 
 35. See id. at 1986–87. 
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maximizing claimants’ recoveries.  They may not lawfully use their powers 
to enrich themselves.”36  Criticizing the lead attorneys’ conduct in the 
Vioxx litigation as “opportunistic,”37
Nowhere does procedure alter the attorney-client relationship more 
emphatically and mysteriously than in class actions.  Alexandra Lahav 
describes the legal system’s “deep ambivalence about class actions”
 he encourages judges to rein in self-
enriching conduct by lead counsel. 
38 and 
the resulting incoherence of class action law.  She suggests that class 
certification renders the lawyer-client relationship largely an exercise of 
imagination.  To Lahav, “[t]he class is a phantom client; like a ghost it at 
once exists and does not exist.”39  Some view class action lawyers as 
entrepreneurs while others view them as public servants, but Lahav notes 
that both views unduly liberate the lawyer from the client.40  She suggests 
that lawyers should attempt to reconstitute the phantom client by polling the 
class to determine class members’ interests, rather than relying solely on 
class representatives.41
What’s the difference between a proceduralist and an ethicist?  In their 
examinations of civil litigation, both proceduralists and ethicists look at 
problems transsubstantively—they are interested in rules and approaches 
that apply across different areas of law and different factual 
circumstances—and both ask not what the outcome should be but how we 
should get there.  But they are interested in different hows.  The 
proceduralist asks how the litigation process should work; the ethicist asks 
how the lawyer should conduct herself.  As the papers in this Symposium 
demonstrate on questions as wide-ranging as sanctions, work product, 
preservation, fees, multidistrict litigation and class representation, one 
cannot fully understand the problems of civil litigation without taking both 
hows into account. 
  Lahav, whose work often bridges the gap between 
procedure and ethics, shows the value of integrating the two fields.  She 
begins with a procedural rule, explores how this procedural rule creates an 
ethical dilemma by obscuring the lawyer-client relationship, and concludes 
with a procedural suggestion for solving the ethical dilemma. 
 
 
 36. Id. at 1990. 
 37. Id. at 1992. 
 38. Lahav, supra note 33, at 1939. 
 39. Id. at 1939. 
 40. Id. at 1941–42. 
 41. Id. at 1947–50. 
